The business world is changing rapidly, and successful business professionals know how to adapt, learn, and solve problems. The reality of the corporate world is that some businesses have shorter life spans than others. Students in the Bucerius Master’s program study the life cycles of businesses, so they learn how to succeed including learning from their mistakes. Their knowledge of the inner workings of businesses, the complexities of the law, and the intersection of the two gives them the ability and confidence to enter into the fast-paced and ever-changing world of business.
Abstract: In Bhasin v Hrynew , the Supreme Court of Canada recognized good faith in contractual performance to be a ‘general organizing principle’ of the common law of contract. The true impact of Bhasin on the future development of the Canadian contract law remains the subject of considerable debate among legal scholars and practitioners. This article explores Bhasin ’s evolutionary impact on the Canadian common law of contract, by providing an institutional understanding of the general organizing principle of good faith in contractual performance. It is contended that Bhasin ’s contribution to the common law of contract is institutional rather than substantive – Bhasin fundamentally alters the organization of the sources of contract law by introducing a new law-making mechanism (that is, ‘law-making through good faith’) that is separate from, and potentially supersedes, the traditional doctrine of precedent. To support the central claim that Bhasin ’s contribution is institutional rather than substantive, I employ three different kinds of arguments that correspond to three distinct, but closely related, dimensions of the principle of good faith in contractual performance: (a) semantic structure; (b) historical origins; and (c) economic function. Although these three lines of inquiry rest on quite different methodological premises, they converge in supporting the central idea that good faith performance is best understood as an institutional mechanism to allocate law-making power rather than a substantive legal principle.